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Accommodating the Law and Economics of
Price Cutting: The Vice or Virtue of Low
Prices
Joel Jay Finer*
One is best punished for one's virtues.
F. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND
EVIL, aphorism 132 (1886).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Contradictory Nature of Federal Policy
On June 12, 1961, the Justice Department threatened the General
Electric Company with divestiture proceedings unless it signed a consent
decree committing it to refrain from selling at "unreasonably low prices
• . . where the effect is, or where there is a reasonable probability that
the effect will be, substantially to injure, suppress or stifle competition
or tend to create a monopoly."' The Government's proposed decree
placed the burden on the company to establish that its future prices were
neither unreasonable nor reasonably likely to cause the prohibited ef-
fects.2 Although General Electric refused to sign the decree, it counter-
offered to refrain from "[flollowing any plan, program or course of
action of selling . . . at unreasonably low prices with the purpose or
intent of substantially suppressing or stifling competition or tending to
create a monopoly."'3 The company's proposed decree also placed the
burden of establishing a failure to comply with its terms upon the
Government. 4
Although the interpretation and application of the federal antitrust
laws are replete with paradoxes, inconsistencies, and seemingly conflict-
ing premises, few situations illustrate the contradictory nature of federal
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. B.B.A. 1959, City College of New
York; M.A., LL.B., 1963, Yale University.
I. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1961, at 1, col. 4; see also N.Y. Times, June 7, 1961, at 1, col. 3.
2. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1961, at 1, col. 4.
3. Id. at 15, col. I (emphasis added).
4. Id.: see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1961, at 69, col. 2, 76, col. 6 (President of GE stated
that he refused to sign the decree "because it would deny our customers the right to have the best
values we can offer, and it would hinder our capacity to compete vigorously with domestic and
foreign competitors.").
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policy toward industrial structure and business behavior as dramatically
as the Justice Department's rejection of General Electric's proposed
decree. For example, one primary objective of the Sherman Act5 is to
prevent practices that tend to restrict output and raise prices,6 and price-
fixing agreements are illegal per se because it is unreasonable to believe
that they have any beneficial results. Many industries exhibit a high
degree of concentration that enables a i'ew firms to operate through a
structure of quasi-agreements and spontaneous coordination, from
which comes an implicit understanding that they will enhance their
individual profits by refraining from engaging in price competition.7 A
major current concern of antitrust administration and industrial eco-
nomics is to find ways of rendering these "oligopolies" more competi-
tive, yet the crux of the government's allegations against General Elec-
tric and its executives was that they participated in a scheme designed
to reduce prices in an oligopolistic industry. In view of the widespread
concern over inflexible, unnaturally high prices, the rationale of the
Justice Department's attempts in similar situations to prohibit "unrea-
sonably low" prices with neither a showing that the alleged violator had
an intent to suppress competition nor an examination of the effect that
the lowering of prices had on the competitive process warrants critical
examination. This Article will first survey the development and present
status of legal limitations upon low or lowered prices. Following sec-
tions will examine the applicable legal doctrines within a framework of
economic analysis, and the final section will propose an approach to the
law of price cutting that attempts to bring it in line with the broader
objectives of antitrust policy.
B. A Survey of the Law
Section 2 of the Sherman Act,' Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act (the
Robinson-Patman Amendment),' and Section 3 of the Robinson-
Patman Act"0 comprise the arsenal of legal restrictions on low prices.
These provisions have existed for many years, but the Supreme Court
never has articulated comprehensive standards for determining the le-
gality of price cutting, and lower judicial and administrative interpreta-
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
6. See H. THORELLI, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 227 (1954).
7. See generally W. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949).
8. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970)).
9. Act of June 19, 1936, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526, amending Clayton Act § 2, 38 Stat.
730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970)).




tions have left innumerable questions unanswered. Since the legality of
low prices often hinges upon whether a seller has acted with a predatory
intent to injure a competitor or whether its actions are likely to have a
predatory effect, the current legal status of price cutting is best discussed
from those standpoints.
I. The Sherman A ct.-A finding of a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits "attempts to monopolize" and "mono-
polization" but does not refer directly to price cutting, occasionally has
been supported by evidence that the defendant engaged in predatory
price cutting. In two classic Sherman Act cases involving the giant oil
and tobacco trusts, Standard Oil Co. v. United States" and United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 2 the Supreme Court accepted the
Government's allegations that the defendants had obtained monopolis-
tic power by using innumerable fraudulent, oppressive, and predatory
business tactics, including cutting local prices below cost, for the pur-
pose of driving competitors out of business or forcing them to join the
defendant combination.'3 On the other hand, when a defendant com-
pany charged with possessing the power and intent to monopolize has
established that it did not engage in secret or less-than-cost price cut-
ting, the Court has given some weight to this evidence in finding no
violation.'4 Findings of monopolization and attempts to monopolize,
therefore, may require the presence of predatory intent, which can be
established by evidence of local, less-than-cost pricing. In these and
other instances, the courts apparently fear the possibility that a large
dominant firm will be able to subsidize its price-cutting losses in a local
market or industry with "outside" funds until local competition is elimi-
nated.
2. The Clayton Act.-Section 2 of the original Clayton Act was
actually designed to regulate local predatory price cutting by monopo-
lists operating in regional or national markets. 5 It was specifically di-
rected at discriminations in price among different purchasers of com-
modities when the price differentials were not justified by allowances for
the quantity or quality of the goods sold, selling or transportation costs,
or when the lower price was not set for the purpose of meeting competi-
II. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
13. Cf. id. at 160-61 ("[Upon American Tobacco Co.'s failure to induce plug manufacturers
to join the combination] ruinous competition, by lowering the price of plug below its cost ensued.
As a result of this warfare. . . the American Tobacco Company sustained severe losses. ... ).
14. See, e.g., United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
15. See E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 6-7 (1970).
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tion. The section, however, proscribed only discriminations whose effect
"may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly in any line of commerce." Although the provision proved generally
ineffective-because of the latitude afforded sellers by the provision
relating to quantity differentials-and was subsequently amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act, 6 Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 7 an important case under the original section, throws
some light on the factors that the courts often consider evidence of
predation.
American Tobacco Company (ATC), which had been selling ciga-
rettes in Puerto Rico for fifteen cents per pack, requested Porto Rican
American Tobacco Company (PRATC) to exert influence to prevent
the passage of tax legislation, the impact of which would fall largely
upon ATC. The legislation, however, was passed, raising ATC's distri-
bution costs by three cents per pack. ATC, apparently motivated by a
desire to retaliate for PRATC's failure to stifle the tax bill, reduced its
price to twelve cents per pack. ATC's price cuts compelled PRATC to
lower its price to ten cents per pack, consequently transforming
PRATC's annual profits of 200,000 to 250,000 dollars into losses of
150,000 to 180,000 dollars. In finding that ATC had predatory intent,
the Second Circuit stressed that, although the cost of cigarettes to ATC
was more than double PRATC's cost, ATC could withstand the losses
precipitated by its price cut because its annual income was more than
three and one-half times PRATC's entire capital, that ATC had guaran-
teed its Puerto Rican distributor 20,000 dollars in annual profits, and
that ATC had accompanied its price cut with an advertising barrage. 8
The court, moreover, stated that price cutting was "foreign to any
legitimate commercial competition" and observed that "[i]f this compe-
tition, resulting in such loss, continued, it is fair to assume that
[PRATC] could not continue in business, and its elimination as a com-
petitor was certain."' 9
3. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.-The Robinson-
Patman Act, which replaced section 2 of the original Clayton Act with
section 2(a), was enacted in response to widespread protests by indepen-
dent wholesalers and retailers against the granting of discriminatory
favors by suppliers to chain stores and mass distributors." Although its
16. Act of June 19, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1970)).
17. 30 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1929).
18. Id. at 236-37.
19. Id. at 237.
20. See E. KINTNER, supra note 15, at 9-14.
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principal objective was to limit the freedom of suppliers to discriminate
among purchasers who compete with one another-the secondary line
of competition 2' -the Act also retained and expanded upon the lan-
guage in the original Clayton Act relating to price competition among
sellers themselves-the primary line of competition. Thus the Act pro-
hibits sellers from discriminating in price "between different purchas-
ers of commodities of like grade and quality" whenever the effect of the
discrimination "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition . . . ." A seller, however, may overcome a prima
facie showing of violation by demonstrating that the challenged price
differentials reflected "differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or
delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered," were "made in
good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor," or were "in
response to changing conditions affecting the market for or marketabil-
ity of the goods concerned."
(a) The Role of Predatory Intent.-Although the statute itself
does not deal specifically with predatory intent, whenever such an intent
has been shown the courts customarily have also found the competitive
injury necessary for a violation of section 2(a). Moreover, despite the
statutory focus on establishing the injurious effects of price cutting, the
courts have apparently relaxed their standards for finding injury when
they believe that predatory intent has been shown, and their current
attitude borders on a per se approach. 2 For example, in Utah Pie Co.
v. Continental Baking Co.,2" Utah Pie charged the Pet Milk Company,
Continental, and the Carnation Company with violations of section 2(a)
in the Salt Lake City market for frozen pies. Utah Pie originally had
entered the market after experiencing failures in the general baking
business. Because its local plant enabled it to operate with substantially
lower local distribution costs, Utah sold 67 percent of the frozen pies
in Salt Lake City in 1958. Faced with elimination from the market, each
of the defendants initiated price cuts, lowering its prices below those
charged in other markets. Consequently, Utah's share declined in 1959
to 34.3 percent, although it recovered to 45.3 percent of the market by
1961, the last year covered by the suit. A jury found that defendants had
violated section 2(a), but the Tenth Circuit reversed24 -reasoning that
21. Id. at 15-16.
22. Id. at 112-14.
23. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
24. Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie Co., 349 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1965).
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since Utah consistently had increased its sales volume and showed prof-
its for the years in question, there was no actual or potential injury to
competition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the improve-
ments in Utah's financial picture did not preclude the jury from finding
a violation of section 2(a).
The controlling factor in the Court's analysis apparently was its
inference of predatory intent on the part of the defendants;25 otherwise,
Utah's steadily improving business would have rebutted a finding of
competitive injury. As to Pet, the Court apparently believed there was
direct evidence of predatory intent. In 1959, Pet's management identi-
fied Utah as "an unfavorable factor" that "d[u]g holes in our opera-
tion" and operated as a constant "check" on its Salt Lake City opera-
tions.26 Pet, moreover, had employed industrial spies in Utah's plant and
suffered substantial losses in Salt Lake City.
There was, however, no conduct on the part of Continental or
Carnation that could be viewed as direct evidence of predatory intent.
The Court apparently inferred predatory intent from the two defen-
dants' responses to Utah's dominant position in the market. In June
1961, Continental had cut its prices and offered its pies at $2.85 per
dozen, a price less than its direct cost including allocations for overhead.
Utah, which prior to Continental's price cuts had sold its two types of
pies for $3.10 and $3.40, responded to Continental's action by lowering
its prices to $2.75 per dozen. On these facts, the Court upheld the jury's
finding of injury to competition, reasoning that "it could . ..have
reasonably concluded that a competitor who is forced to reduce his price
to a new all-time low in a market of declining prices will in time feel
the financial pinch and will be a less effective competitive force. 127 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court disregarded several countervailing
factors. Continental, for example, had refused to match Utah's price of
$2.75 per dozen, a circumstance not wholly consistent with a view that
Continental had acted with predatory intent. Moreover, Utah retained
25. E. KINTER, supra note 15, at 115.
26. 386 U.S. at 697. The subsequent economic analysis of this Article will show, however,
that the factors used by the Court as evidence of predatory intent are consistent with legitimate
competition, indicating no more than Pet's desire to win business from Utah. For an excellent
analysis and criticism of the decision by an author who describes it as "the most anticompetitive
decision of the decade" see Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie
Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 (1967). Professor Bowman asserts that the Utah Pie decision was based on
the decline in Utah's market share, but the Court's opinion does not indicate that it felt this factor
decisive or even important. For a more sympathetic view of the decision see Murray, Injury to
Competition Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Futility Revisited, 29 U. Pirr. L. REv. 623 (1968).
27. 386 U.S. at 699-700.
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its share of the market during the year of Continental's price cuts at 45
percent and substantially increased its sales volume.
As to Carnation, the Court concluded that the jury reasonably
could have found that in 1960-61 Carnation sold below costs. Again,
however, the Court's conclusion apparently disregarded other factors.
Carnation did not increase its share of the market during the period of
the price cuts, while Utah-the purported victim-increased its share
from 34.3 to 45.3 percent. Moreover, "during the two years subsequent
to the price cut, Carnation's below-cost prices. . . were generally above
Utah Pie's special, big-buyer, brand price and seldom below the price
charged for the plaintiff's regular brand."' '
(b) Price Cutting Without Predatory Intent.-Despite the signifi-
cant role that predatory intent has played in price-cutting decisions,
findings of section 2(a) violations have not invariably turned upon evi-
dence of predatory intent. The courts, however, have made a more
conscientious effort to find evidence of injury to competition when the
defendant's conduct does not readily permit an inference of predatory
intent that would trigger the virtual per se approach of Utah Pie. For
example, when the absence of sales below cost has not permitted an
inference of predatory intent, the courts have departed from Utah Pie's
implicit concern for preventing injury to competitors by expanding their
inquiry to require instead a causal link between the seller's low prices
and an injury to the competitive process.2 9 These cases additionally have
rejected the Federal Trade Commission's previously stated view that the
proper test of requisite injury is to ascertain whether a seller's low prices
divert trade from a competitor. 0 Samuel H. Moss, Inc.31 best exempli-
fies the Commission's "diversion" philosophy. Moss, a small manufac-
turer of rubber stamps in New York City, competed with at least 70
other such manufacturers. The Commission concluded that Moss' sales
of the same product at different prices to different customers violated
section 2(a) by reasoning that the "practices of the respondent have the
capacity and tendency to induce the purchase of respondent's rubber
stamps by various users thereof and have tended to, and do, divert trade
to the respondent from its competitors. The lower prices at which res-
28. E. KINTNER, supra note 15, at 118.
29. Id. at 125.
30. See, e.g., Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953), in which the FTC prohibited a regional
dairy from charging lower prices in particular localities than it charged elsewhere, although the
dairy's costs were lower than the costs of its local competitors and the lower price apparently
increased its profits. The FTC found the requisite injury by reasoning that retailers' narrow profit
margin on milk readily induced them to divert purchases in response to price changes.
31. 36 F.T.C. 640 (1943), aff'd, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
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pondent offered for sale and sold its rubber stamps... had a substan-
tially injurious effect upon competition . *... ,32
Although the Second Circuit affirmed the Moss opinion,33 more
recent decisions have established that the effect of price cutting on
competition, rather than the mere circumstance of trade diversion, is
the relevant consideration. For example, in H. J. Heinz Co. v. Beech-
Nut Life Savers, Inc.,34 the federal district court undertook a compre-
hensive market analysis when Heinz sued Beech-Nut on the ground
that Beech-Nut's price reductions in California violated section 2(a).
In 1957, Beech-Nut sold approximately seven percent of the baby food
in California, while Heinz sold sixteen percent and Gerber Products
Company 77 percent. Each company sold baby food nationally, and
both Heinz and Beech-Nut marketed other products nationally. Dur-
ing 1957, Beech-Nut initiated local price cuts that precipitated a price
war. As a consequence, both Heinz and Beech-Nut suffered heavy
losses. After the conflict, Gerber controlled 70 percent of the California
market and Heinz and Beech-Nut held twenty and ten percent. Heinz
thereafter sued Beech-Nut, alleging that Beech-Nut's California price
reductions were illegal territorial price discriminations. Beech-Nut
moved for summary judgment and argued that prior section 2(a) cases
had involved powerful national sellers cutting prices against weaker
local competitors. Heinz's assets and earned surplus, on the other
hand, were 300 and 250 percent of those of Beech-Nut. Heinz had
larger gross sales than Beech-Nut, and a larger percentage of the
market. Moreover, argued Beech-Nut, Heinz's investment in Cali-
fornia was so large that the possibility of its deciding to leave the mar-
ket rather than meet its competitor's price reductions was minimal.
Thus Beech-Nut concluded that when a price cut occurs in a market
"where the competitors are of equal or substantially equal strength,
there is no reason to suppose that normal competitive responses will
not protect the competitive process."35
Implicitly recognizing the validity of Beech-Nut's claims, Heinz
32. 36 F.T.C. at 648-49.
33. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945). In affirming the FTC, the
Second Circuit went even further than the FTC with regard to placing restrictions on discrimina-
tory price reductions. The court suggested that discrimination was unlawful if the lower price
tended "to prevent competitors from taking business away from the merchant [price cutter] which
they might have got, had the merchant not lowered his price below what he was charging else-
where." Id. at 379. Thus, whereas the FTC had found injury in the acquisition of more customers
by aggressive price cutting, the Second Circuit reasoned that injury resulted merely from retaining
existing customers by defensive price cutting.
34. 181 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
35. 181 F. Supp. at 461. See also E. KINTNER, supra note 15, at 126-29.
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sought to show that it was actually the weaker company. Thus Heinz
argued that its assets were committed to expansion, while Beech-Nut
had a 25,000,000-dollar "war chest." Beech-Nut, moreover, had higher
profits. Heinz's food business, on the other hand, operated at a low
profit margin, thus affording it no opportunity to subsidize its Califor-
nia losses with high profits from other lines.
The court denied Beech-Nut's motion. It found that there was a
genuine dispute over Beech-Nut's intent, which was "relevant" but "not
essential" to a finding of injury. 6 Noting that in the context of this
particular market the elimination of one of the three major suppliers
could possibly have an impact on competition, the court stated that
Beech-Nut had mistakenly emphasized size rather than the qualitative
factors that separate one competitor from another.17
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC,38 the Seventh Circuit used a
similar analysis when defendant established legitimate motives for its
conduct, and predatory intent therefore could not be readily inferred.
Anheuser-Busch, a nationally known brewer, had lowered its St. Louis
prices in two steps, thereby eliminating the difference between its price
and the price charged by local competitors. Concurrently with its price
cuts, Anheuser increased its advertising expenses, reorganized its sales
force, and changed its methods of delivery and solicitation. Prior to
adopting these tactics, Anheuser's sales had declined nationwide be-
cause, rather than absorbing wage increases internally, it had increased
the differential between its prices and those of its St. Louis competitors.
Although it later raised its prices to restore the earlier price differential,
Anheuser's changed policies increased its share of the St. Louis market
from 12.5 to 17.5 percent. During the period that Anheuser maintained
its price cuts, its competitors continued to charge their original prices,
but also varied and intensified their competitive activities. Each compet-
itor continued to earn profits.
The FTC invoked its diversion theory, holding that Anheuser's
conduct violated section 2(a).3 9 The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed.
Noting the absence of evidence that Anheuser had used profits from
other areas to subsidize losses in St. Louis or even that Anheuser had
taken losses in St. Louis at all, the court found that Anheuser-Busch's
reductions "were parts of an experimental program of sales promotion
36. 181 F. Supp. at 465-66.
37. Id. at 464.
38. 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961), on remand from 363 U.S. 536 (1960), rev'g 265 F.2d 677
(1959).
39. 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957).
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in the St. Louis market and. . . were temporary and made necessary
by competitive conditions."4 The court explained that the section was
not concerned with "mere shifts of business between competitors";
rather, the section's concern was for "the vigor or health of the contest
for business, regardless of which competitor wins or loses. '" '41 Pointing
out that one local competitor's beer was so "badly named, poorly mer-
chandised, bitter in tase, and 'wild'-that is with unstabilized air con-
tent"-that consumers "disliked" it, and that another local competitor
was badly managed, the court was unable to find a causal connection
between Anheuser's price cuts and an actual or potential impairment of
the competitive process.42
4. Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act.-Section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act is the remaining weapon in the arsenal of legal
restrictions on low prices. The section imposes criminal penalties upon
persons who "sell, or contract to sell, goods in any part of the United
States at prices lower than those exacted [elsewhere]" or who "sell, or
contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices," in either case "for
the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor."
Pricing with such a purpose may violate section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act as well, which probably
accounts for the Government's rare attempts to impose criminal penal-
ties under section 3.43 Until 1958, many courts permitted private liti-
gants to bring treble damage actions under the section," but in Nashville
Milk Co. v. Carnation Co.45 the Supreme Court held that section 3 was
not intended to provide a civil remedy, reasoning in part that "it is not
idle conjecture that the possibility of abuse inherent in a private cause
of action based upon this vague provision was among the factors which
led Congress to leave the enforcement . . . solely in the hands of the
public authorities . . . ."" Although defendants have repeatedly ques-
tioned the constitutionality of section 3 on the ground that it is overly
vague and thus fails to provide fair warning of criminal conduct, the
40. 289 F.2d at 839.
41. Id. at 840.
42. Id. at 837 n.4.
43. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 665 (1967).
44. See, e.g., Dean Oil Co. v. American Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 414 (D.N.J. 1956), affd, 254
F.2d 816 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 835 (1958); Hershel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods,
119 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Cal. 1954), appeal dismissed, 221 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1955); Myers v. Shell
Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn.
1950).
45. 355 U.S. 373 (1958).
46. Id. at 378.
47. See, e.g., Vance v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.M. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 355 U.S. 389 (1958).
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Supreme Court upheld the section in United States v. National Dairy
Products Corp.," in which the defendant was charged with less-than-
cost sales made "without legitimate commercial objective and with spe-
cific intent to destroy competition . . . ."I The Court, moreover, has
held in another context that "the requirement of a specific intent to do
a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which
may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid."5 Thus proof
of predatory intent beyond a reasonable doubt is an essential element
of every section 3 case.51
II. STRUCTURAL PREREQUISITES FOR HARMFUL PRICE CUTTING
As the preceding section of this Article indicates, the legality of a
particular price cut under existing law will hinge upon whether the seller
acted with predatory intent or whether its price cut will damage the
competitive process. In either instance the courts have adopted less-
than-cost pricing and a relative ability to subsidize local price cuts with
other funds as the talismans of illegality. Unless satisfactorily explain-
ed, either will trigger a virtual per se violation of the antitrust laws. The
antitrust laws, however, condemn anticompetitive practices, not merely
lowering prices below cost or using retained earnings to subsidize sales.
In relying on these practices as critical determinants of antitrust liabil-
ity, courts remain within the bounds of the statutory language and the
congressional intent only to the extent that such practices in fact result
in harm to competition. The remainder of this Article will attempt to
show that the de facto presumption of anticompetitive effect applied
under current law to below-cost pricing and "deep pocket" capability
can result in blanket condemnation of entirely legitimate competitive
behavior and should therefore be replaced by judicial standards that
accurately reflect the specialized conditions which make particular price
cuts harmful. This section of the Article describes the structural precon-
ditions for harmful price cutting, and section III will describe the situa-
48. 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
49. Id. at 37. See also E. KINTNER, supra note 15, at 267-68.
50. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945). For an analysis of the arguments
questioning the constitutionality of § 3 see ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMM. To STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 201 (1955).
51. See also Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F.2d 481, 486 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 910 (1957), in which the court stated "that a pricing policy based on sound economics is
inadmissible simply because it may result in the destruction of a competitor, for it is not within
the scope or purpose of the antitrust laws to protect a business against loss in a competitive
market .... If ... the price reductions ... were made to increase volume and decrease unit




tions in which firms utilize less-than-cost pricing and externally subsi-
dized local price cuts for competitively legitimate reasons. Since price
cutting that damages the competitive process should, of course, be con-
demned, the final section of this Article will propose new criteria for
evaluating the legality of price cuts.
A. An Overview of the Competitive Process
Although economists and policy makers often disagree over how
best to promote the competitive process, there is a general consensus
that its primary goal is to yield a high output of goods and services at
prices reflecting the relative intensities of consumer demand for them.
In order to implement that goal, economic theory initially presumes that
each individual and business unit seeks to maximize something: indivi-
duals strive to maximize utility, which they derive from consuming
goods and services; business units, to maximize the surplus of their total
receipts over total costs. 5 Several consequences flow from this initial
presumption. If competition worked perfectly, all the firms in an indus-
try, each of which manufactured an identical product, would produce a
minute share of the industry's output, and no single firm could influence
the price of its product. Any increase in demand for the industry's
product would immediately prompt the entry of new firms into the
industry, thereby eliminating the opportunity for existing producers to
acquire excess profits. A fall in demand, on the other hand, would cause
the instantaneous exit of marginal, high-cost producers and restore prof-
its to their normal level. Industry entry and exit would thus be cost free,
with the entire industry remaining in a state of equilibrium. Moreover,
each firm would limit its competitive activity to attempts to reduce its
costs, and prices would settle at the average cost of the industry's repre-
sentative firm. The virtue of such a perfectly competitive system is that
price tends to fall and output to increase for the products demanded
most. Resources would automatically flow from low demand industries
to industries facing greater demand and therefore offering higher prof-
its. The influx of new resources into the high demand industry would
continue until the industry price was forced down to a level necessary
to supply demarid, a level that would also represent the average cost of
the industry's representative firm.
Actual competition, however, functions quite differently from the
52. Although the frequent allegation that profit maximization is an unrealistic view of behav-
ior motivation undoubtedly contains more than a few grains of truth, the assumption has proven




theoretical model of perfect competition. Each firm has some control
over the price that it charges for its product. The ability of a firm in a
less than perfectly competitive industry to exercise control over its price
stems from three factors. First, one firm's product is rarely identical to
those of its competitors. Secondly, a firm can increase the demand for
its product, and hence the price at which it can sell a given output, by
stimulating consumer interest through advertising and sales techniques.
Thirdly, most industries have barriers to entry that obstruct the efforts
of new competitors to share in its profits. Thus, in the imperfectly
competitive economy of the real world, consumers pay higher prices for
fewer goods and services than they would pay if the competitive process
were theoretically perfect.
Realizing the impracticability of achieving perfect competition,
economists have suggested criteria for characterizing a workable, prac-
tically obtainable competition as the goal of antitrust policy, 53 through
an economic model based upon the maximization of consumer welfare.
According to this model, the consumer's welfare is enhanced if actual
or potential rivals can reduce the power of a seller to raise its price and
lower its output. When the presence of actual and potential competitors
means that a firm cannot increase its profits by raising prices above the
prevailing industry level, each firm will continually seek to achieve that
objective-and incidentally maximize consumer welfare-by increasing
its managerial and technological efficiency, by improving the quality of
its product and services, and generally by offering the consumer a more
attractive package at lower prices than rival firms. In order for the
model to function effectively, barriers to entry and exit must be rela-
tively low, so that resources can flow to those industries offering high
profits and from industries with low profit levels. Each firm, moreover,
must independently determine its competitive policies and be unable to
predict with certainty the speed, magnitude, and direction of its rivals'
responses. Collusion or conscious parallelism among rival sellers would
thwart the vigorous price competition needed to keep prices low and
output high. The ultimate result of workable competition is that ineffi-
cient competitors cannot prevent a firm able to produce at a lower cost
from making its best offer to the consumer. On the other hand, a firm
53. The following materials have been utilized in the section on competition and workable
competition: J. CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS (1961); J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR
COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY (1954); C. EDWARDS, MAINTAIN-
ING COMPETITION (1949); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959); J. MILLER,
UNFAIR COMPETITION (1941); C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS (1960); ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMM. To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT (1955); Clark, Toward
a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REv. 241 (1940).
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offering an inferior package is not protected from, suffering reduced
profits, losses, or complete economic elimination as a result of its ineffi-
ciency, and bankruptcy serves to weed out the incompetents, reduce the
excess capitalization of overexpanded industries, and realign resource
allocation. The discussion that follows is an attempt to define the rela-
tionship of price cutting to the goal of workable competition-to deter-
mine the circumstances under which price cutting furthers or frustrates
the procompetitive objectives of antitrust policy. In addition to provid-
ing guides for judicial interpretation, the discussion is intended to point
out the limitations of economic theory as a policy-making tool.
B. The Structural Prerequisites of Predatory Price Cutting
Low prices, the primary objective of workable competition, are
undesirable when they induce firms to leave an industry and enable the
surviving seller or sellers to charge a higher price and produce a lower
output than before the price was cut. A frequently voiced complaint is
that firms engage in price cutting to eliminate their competitors and
thereby gain greater control over price. The success of such maneuvers,
however, hinges upon the ability of the price cutter to recoup more than
the costs of its predatory policy by subsequently raising its prices. Un-
less a predatory policy appears profitable, the managers of a firm would
fail to gain anything from undertaking it.
1. The Costs of Economic Warfare. 4"-Assume that a price cut-
ter, firm A, has one competitor, firm B, in the relevant market. The
costs to A of eliminating B will be determined by the comparative
efficiencies of the two firms and B's opportunity costs, which are the
potential earnings that B's resources could earn when employed in their
most productive alternative use. Thus, assuming that firms act ration-
ally to maximize profits, if B's potential earnings elsewhere, reduced by
the costs of leaving the industry and entering another, exceed its earn-
ings from present operations, it will transfer its resources to the more
profitable alternative employment. In practical terms, firm B will decide
to manufacture a different product, transfer itself to another market, or
junk its resources.
If A is more efficient than B,55 B eventually may decide to leave
54. The primary materials employed in this section are: J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, note 53
supra; F. MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS' COMPETITION (1952); J. MILLER, note 53 supra;
Weintraub, Price-Cutting and Economic Warfare, 8 So. ECON. J. 309 (1941-42).
55. A is more efficient than B if A's lowest average unit cost and variable cost per unit are
less than B's. Average unit cost is the sum of fixed and variable costs per unit at one particular
output. Fixed cost, or overhead, includes rent, depreciation, and maintenance, plus other recurring
charges. Variable costs are all other costs per unit of output-for example, raw materials, wages,
and fuel. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 453-58 (7th ed. 1967).
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the industry or market without any impetus from A. If B's resources
are flexible, even a small difference in efficiency may convince its man-
agers to leave the industry or market." On the other hand, if B's re-
sources are specialized or immobile, the costs to B of leaving the indus-
try may convince it to remain and compete with A, despite even a
substantial disparity in efficiency. A, therefore, would be forced to en-
gage in price cuts to eliminate B as a competitor.
If A decides to eliminate B, A's superior efficiency does not neces-
sarily mean that it can continue to maximize its profits, or even make
any profits at all, during the time it takes to convince B to leave. If B's
resources are somewhat specialized or immobile, its reaction to A's low
prices would likely be as follows: B will cut its own prices and continue
producing as long as its price generates net revenues in excess of its total
variable costs. Since its fixed costs will be incurred regardless of whether
it ceases production, B has nothing to gain by shutting down. B will shut
down only when A supplies a large enough portion of the market at a
price so low that B cannot supply any remaining portion at a price above
its variable costs. If the price necessary to convince B to shut down is
not less than the price A would charge in the absence of a design to
eliminate B, then B's elimination entails no cost to A, since A foregoes
no profits. If the necessary price is above A's average cost but below
the price that would otherwise maximize its profits, A's predatory policy
entails a real cost measured by its foregone profits. If the necessary price
is below A's average cost but above its variable costs, A will lose money
on its total investment-but as long as A operates more efficiently than
B, A can successfully continue its predatory campaign without relying
on outside financial resources, and the costs to A will still be measured
by foregone profits. If the necessary price is below A's variable cost,
however, A will be able to continue its campaign only if it possesses or
has access to outside financial resources. When A is endowed with
considerable financial resources and is willing to utilize its deep pocket
to eliminate B, the comparative efficiencies of the firms may not be
determinative: A might be capable of eliminating B even if the latter
firm possessed superior efficiency. Although the cost to A of eliminating
B would still depend on the firms' efficiencies, A's actual ability to
56. Economic analysis can do little more than recognize that at some point B may leave the
industry: the factors entering into the decision of B's managers cannot be quantified. B's managers
will, of course, be strongly influenced by their psychological makeup-optimism, pessimism, dog-
matism, caution, timidity, etc. When it is recalled that the relevant decision is made by A's
managers, who must estimate the characteristics of B's managers before deciding to undertake a
price cut, the problem becomes even more difficult.
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eliminate B in this case would hinge solely upon the extent to which A's
access to liquid assets exceeds B's.
If B responds to A's price cut by setting a price that generates
revenues above its total variable cost but less than its average cost, B
will continue producing until it cannot meet its fixed costs with current
assets and is, therefore, insolvent. At that point, reorganization or bank-
ruptcy proceedings will ensue. B's creditors may be compelled to write
off part of their claims, or new owners may obtain the firm's plant and
equipment at current value. In either case, B can acquire a new lease
on life; a substantial portion of its capital costs will be written off, and
B's new managers may be able to employ the firm's devalued resources
profitably at a market price considerably lower than previously re-
quired. Moreover, even if A remains able to sell at a price too low for
B to profit by reopening its plant, A will not necessarily have accom-
plished its purpose. As long as B continues to overhang the market, A
will be unable to recoup its losses or foregone profits. If B's productive
resources are extremely specialized or immobile, they will be a potential
threat to A's ambition until they become worn out, obsolete, or are sold
as scrap. Furthermore, as the number of competitors and the size of the
market increase, the cost to A of becoming the sole survivor and the
financial power needed by A to absorb that cost will increase correspon-
dingly.
2. Subsequent Recoupment of Losses or Foregone Profits in the
Absence of Barriers to Entry.17-A price-cutting firm will profit from a
predatory campaign only if it subsequently can recoup more than its
battlefield costs by raising prices to a monopoly level. The ability of the
predatory firm to raise its prices depends on the extent to which new
firms may be deterred from entering the industry or market. An effi-
cient firm that attains a dominant market position in an industry with
low barriers to entry can retain that dominance only by remaining more
efficient than potential competitors and periodically demonstrating its
superior efficiency. In the previous example, A convinced B to leave the
industry because A supplied a large portion of the market at a price that
made it impossible for B to supply the remaining share at a price above
its variable costs. A new firm would not enter the industry or market
unless it expected at least to recover its average costs; therefore, as long
as A's average and variable units costs remain below those of potential
entrants, entry into A's industry or market would be unprofitable.
57. The material in this section derives from: Leeman, The Limitations of Local Price-
Cutting as a Barrier to Entry, 64 J. POL. ECON. 329 (1956); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J. LAW & ECON. 137 (1958).
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If potential entrants have access to the machinery, equipment,
tools, and skills needed to compete with A, and those resources are
sufficiently divisible to permit additions to the productive capacity of
the industry or market at a modest initial investment, any attempt by
A to set a high price would draw a swarm of new competitors. A's costs
may be unknown, but prospective entrants are likely to compare their
expected costs with A's price, which they will treat as "proving" demand
at that level, and will thus enter when A's price suggests that profits can
be made. In order to demonstrate a power of effective price competition,
A would have to prove its capacity by continued periods of regular low
prices. Moreover, prolonged periods of high prices might lead A to
become lax in keeping uneconomical operations at a minimum, and it
could fail to keep up to date on new and more efficient production, sales,
and managerial techniques." Thus an efficient firm facing the threat of
potential entrants is likely to keep its prices low in order to retain its
cost advantages and convince potential entrants of its superior effi-
ciency.
It is sometimes argued that, even in the absence of barriers to entry,
mere threats of a price war by a financially powerful firm will convince
potential entrants of equal or greater efficiency not to enter the industry
or market.59 Although it has a surface attractiveness, the contention
appears somewhat blemished upon close scrutiny. In order for A's
threat to be credible, A must reinforce it by sporadic price wars. Unless
A believes that its current liquid income from other sources is sufficient
to subsidize its losses,6" the expectation of price wars will require it to
hold liquid assets in reserve. A consequently must forego any earnings
other than low interest on the funds in its "war chest." Each time it
employs the war chest, A additionally foregoes all future earnings on
the funds expended. Moreover, if A sells five times the volume of an
equally efficient potential entrant, A must be prepared to absorb five
times the losses. If the potential entrant is more efficient than A, the
latter's losses would be correspondingly greater. A also may be required
to defend a larger geographical area than a particular potential competi-
tor might wish to enter, and thus A would require an even greater supply
of liquid assets. Finally, if A has existing regional, national, or foreign
competition possessing equal or greater liquid wealth, a high price or
high profits in the local market could induce them to compete.
58. Labor unions, furthermore, often attribute a firm's increased profits to alleged increases
in labor productivity. Thus derives their ability to demand and often receive a considerable share
of a firm's monopoly profits.
59. See, e.g., Leeman, supra note 57, at 330.
60. See pages 277-78 supra.
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A firm contemplating a predatory policy that will entail short-run
losses must weigh the certain costs of its policy against the speculative
possibility of recouping its losses. The gamble involves considerably
more risk than the managers of successful corporations are accustomed
to assuming. Corporate managers, who personally have more to lose
from an unsuccessful venture than they could gain from a successful
project of equal magnitude, are far more likely to be risk-averters than
risk-seekers. Their inherent conservatism thus will lead them to reject
a policy that offers equal probabilities of substantial gain or loss and to
demand a clearly discernible margin of safety before undertaking a
predatory policy.
3. Subsequent Recoupment of Costs When Barriers to Entry
Exist. 6t-Natural or artificial barriers to new competition arguably pro-
vide the safety margin necessary to convince corporate managers that
a predatory policy should be undertaken.12 The capital required to con-
struct and equip an efficient plant can pose a significant barrier to the
potential competitors of a predatory firm. The minimum cost of estab-
lishing a reasonably efficient operation varies considerably among in-
dustries," and the highly specialized nature of many plants often re-
quires large sums of money. Although attempts to estimate the signifi-
cance of capital requirements as a barrier to entry necessarily rest upon
speculative judgments, 4 it seems unlikely that amounts over 5,000,000
dollars can be raised without access to organized capital markets. Abso-
lute cost barriers are not, however, a factor militating solely in favor of
predation. Although it could furnish a shield for high prices after a
successful predatory campaign, the existence of an entry barrier typi-
cally implies an exit barrier of equal magnitude. Thus the cost of elimi-
nating a firm that has invested large sums in its capital plant will usually
be extremely high. A firm contemplating predation in an industry with
61. The material in this section derives largely from the following sources: J. BAIN, BARRIERS
TO NEw COMPETITION (1956); Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, in R. HEFLE-
BOWER & G. STOCKING, READINGS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1956);
F. MACHLUP, note 54 supra; Modigliani, New Developments on the Oligopoly Front, 66 J. POL.
ECON. 215 (1958).
62. The "safety-margin" thesis is suggested in W. FELLNER, supra note 7, at 152-54.
63. The cost a few years ago of a reasonably efficient plant in some industries was as follows:
a shoe manufacturing plant-500,000 to S2,000,000; a metal container plant-S5,000,000 to
$20,000,000; a rayon plant-$50,000,000 to $135,000,000; and an integrated steel plant-
$265,000,000 to $665,000,000. See J. BAIN, supra note 61, at 158-59.
64. See J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 282-84 (2d ed. 1968).
65. Product differentiation may also work as a barrier to entry, but to the extent that it is a
cost barrier, it probably also entails equivalent barriers to exit. A firm that has spent large sums
establishing a consumer following will be difficult to drive out unless it can transfer and retain the
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significant cost barriers must, therefore, incorporate the likelihood of
tenacious resistance into its initial decision to undertake a price cut.
Given the speculative nature of predatory warfare, the inherent conserv-
atism of corporate managers, and the genuine virtues of legitimate price
competition, reason strongly counsels in favor of viewing price cutting
in an industry with high absolute cost barriers to entry as nonpredatory.
In addition to absolute cost barriers, economies of scale also could
provide the shield to protect a price-cutting firm. Economies of scale
occur when increasing size permits greater specialization in the use of
the factors or agencies of production-plants, machinery, equipment,
and tools. If the smallest scale at which a firm can achieve the reasona-
ble efficiency"6 necessary for profitable competition is one that produces
a significant portion of the industry or market output, the knowledge
that its additional production would depress prices and thus lower prof-
its might deter a potential entrant from competition. Moreover, that the
existing firm's current price exceeds the potential entrant's long run
average cost would not guarantee entry, because the most important
price to a potential competitor is the one likely to result from its addi-
tion to industry output."
Little empirical evidence exists with regard to the relationship be-
tween absolute cost barriers and economies of scale, but a priori reason-
ing suggests that there is a strong correlation between the two. Although
it is, of course, true that the plant size required to satisfy a significant
proportion of total market demand is a function of market size, achiev-
ing economies of scale typically requires substantial capital outlays for
benefits of its consumer loyalty in another product or geographical market. However, consumer
loyalty that is transferable between 2 markets is an additional inducement to enter the relevant
market. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the ability to differentiate a product is an effective
means of overcoming barriers to entry. Twedt, How To Plan New Products, Improve Old Ones
and Create Better Advertising, in PRODUCT MANAGEMENT: SELECTED READINGS 84, 85 (1970);
Smith. Product Differentiation and Market Segmentation as Alternative Marketing Strategies, 21
J. MARKETING 3 (1956). If a predatory firm has succeeded in establishing such a high degree of
consumer loyalty that its product is considered "unique," then it should be deemed to control an
artificial entry barrier, and should be subject to the legal controls limiting other artificial barriers.
See note 68-70 infra and accompanying text.
66. A firm with "reasonable" efficiency has unit costs that are not significantly higher than
the lowest attainable unit cost for the industry.
67. Although economies of scale do permit a surviving firm to exercise some control over
price, its power is often less than a genuine monopolist's because the possibility of entry will still
influence its price. Acting rationally, the firm will set a limit price that is as high as it can charge
without inducing entry. The minimum efficient output, market demand, the added costs of produc-
ing at less than optimum scale, and the reaction of price to increases in supply will determine the
limit price. It will be high when the output of an efficient entrant would effect a significant drop
in price, the costs of producing at less than optimum scale are high, or slack demand permits small
increases in supply to cause large decreases in price.
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specialized plants, machinery, equipment, tools, and processes. Thus the
existence of economies of scale often implies the concomitant existence
of high exit barriers, and the considerations previously discussed in
relation to absolute cost barriers again militate in favor of construing
ambiguous price cuts as nonpredatory. On the other hand, when abso-
lute cost barriers are insubstantial, the unlikely presence of economies
of scale nevertheless may provide the margin of safety that will prompt
a firm to embark upon a predatory campaign.
Although absolute cost barriers and economies of scale are the
most significant barriers to entry in our economy, firms sometimes
exclusively possess resources that are essential to production or distribu-
tion. Thus, a firm may have patents that protect essential technical
processes, control the local supply of a complementary means of pro-
duction (for example, a fuel), own all the available sites for additional
plants, control the channels of distribution through vertical integration
or exclusive dealing arrangements, or enjoy a governmental privilege
(for example, a license, franchise, or tax exemption). Although these
"artificial" barriers initially might appear to offer shelter for successful
predators, adequate legal devices for overcoming them may already
exist. Exclusive dealing arrangements and mergers that significantly
restrict the supply of important resources violate the Clayton Act.6"
Patents, in the rare cases in which they are a significant barrier, are
subject to compulsory licensing. 9 Refusal to sell an essential resource
to a potential competitor probably violates section 2 of the Sherman
Act,70 and distributing a scarce resource to a subsidiary at cost while
extracting a profit from others possibly violates section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act.
A predatory policy thus appears to hold a reasonable probability
of success only in the uncommon situations when economies of scale are
not accompanied by absolute cost barriers to entry, when barriers to
entry markedly exceed industry exit barriers, or when a single firm has
exclusive control of resources essential to potential competitors that
68. Clayton Act §§ 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1970).
69. Cf. Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); United States v. National
Lead Co., 333 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
354 (D. Mass. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding fifty thousand dollars,




cannot be released by other antitrust remedies. Genuinely predatory
price cutting is undoubtedly an evil, but a policy that fails to recognize
its high improbability and treats predation as anything but a rarity will
too often produce results that substantially impair the health of the
competitive process.
C. Nonpredatory Price Cutting in Pursuit of Efficiency
Before examining the structural conditions that arguably make
nonpredatory price cutting harmful, it would be worthwhile to consider
briefly the effect of a policy that forbids discriminatory price cutting
without regard for predatory intent or the possible acquisition of a
power to control price. The essence of competition is a struggle between
firms to attract business by offering consumers the best product for the
lowest price. Forbidding a seller to divert trade from a less efficient
competitor promotes inefficient operations, protects unnecessarily high
prices, and prevents an efficient allocation of resources. Secret, selec-
tive, local price cutting is often the mechanism that weakens and eventu-
ally crumbles the artifically high price floors of oligopolistic industries.
Prohibiting such anti-oligopolistic price cutting, however, buttresses ar-
tifically parallel price patterns and thwarts antitrust policy, which in
other contexts unequivocally condemns price fixing arrangements.'
Moreover, that a competitor's pursuit of efficiency may force an ineffi-
cient seller from business is surely an inadequate justification for me-
chanically condemning low prices. The profit incentive is seldom enough
to ensure efficiency; the threat of loss and possible bankruptcy are also
needed. Unless competition "hurts," incompetent firms utilizing the
least efficient techniques and therefore offering the least attractive terms
would pollute the streams of the competitive system. Prohibiting dis-
criminatory pricing without requiring predatory intent or a power to
control price is no more rational than boarding up hospitals because
unsterilized instruments may spread disease.
There is, of course, the possibility in an industry with barriers to
entry that a firm lowering its price in pursuit of efficiency will eliminate
its competitors and thereby obtain substantial power over prices.7 2 A
71. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
72. Materials employed in writing the following analysis include: J. CLARK, note 53 supra;
J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, note 53 supra; C. EDWARDS, note 53 supra; J. MILLER, note 53 supra; C.
WILCOX, note 53 supra; Ferrall, Quantity Discounts and Competition: Economic Rationality of
Robinson-Patman, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 146 (1960); Reynolds, Cutthroat Competition, 30 AM.
EcoN. REV. 736 (1940); Comment, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing Under
State Law, 57 YALE L.J. 391 (1948). Of course, the above authors do not necessarily agree with
any or all of this analysis.
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single firm can eliminate its competitors while pursuing efficiency only
if it can profitably supply a large portion of the market at a price below
the average cost of its competitors. 73 If substantial exit barriers exist,
the firm must additionally sell at a price below its competitors' variable
costs. 74 In order for either of those possibilities to exist, the industry
must possess substantial excess capacity-a condition that often accom-
panies economies of scale. The need to cope with unpredictable upsurges
in demand requires a firm to maintain some excess capacity. Additional
excess capacity, however, reflects an ability to charge more than a
perfectly competitive price and thus operate above the firm's lowest cost
output. Further excess capacity indicates a significant misallocation of
resources, implying either that the number of firms is too large to permit
each to operate at its lowest cost output without depressing the price
below the industry's representative average cost or that the industry's
firms collusively or independently have coordinated their activities to
restrict output and raise price. If one firm can eliminate its competitors
without taking losses or foregoing profits, at least the former and per-
haps also the latter possibility is indicated. In either event, the elimina-
tion of one or more competitors will rid the market of substantial idle
resources, and it is quite possible that the surviving firm's price will not
exceed the market price prevailing prior to the price cut, since that price
had to be high enough to permit an inefficient, unnecessary competitor
to survive.
Considering the problem within the framework of a policy that
favors the promotion of free enterprise, the wasted resources of excess
capacity are a greater evil than the possibility that a higher price would
result if the excess were eliminated. Other industries probably could
better utilize the resources released by an efficiency-seeking price cut,
and the price in an industry to which the resources are transferred could
well be reduced sufficiently to offset any price rise in the first industry.
Moreover, efficiently operating firms from other markets probably
could add moderate supplies if the price increase in the first industry
were significant. Thus, low prices set in pursuit of efficiency should be
permitted regardless of their effect,75 and the benefits of genuine price
73. See pages 276-78 supra.
74. See pages 277-78 supra.
75. Those who contend that the Robinson-Patman Act protects "competitors" at the ex-
pense of "competition" have misconstrued the intent of Congress. The civil provisions do not
employ the word "competitor," but forbid injuries to "competition." The Act protects individual
sellers from the impact of competition in pursuit of efficiency only when the defendant has obtained
its efficiency by unfair or oppressive tactics. For example, the chairman of the House committee
that reported the bill stated, when discussing the "cost" defense, that "the bill assures to the mass
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competition demand that ambiguous price cuts should be construed in
favor of the price cutter.
III. THE SELLER'S PRICE-COST RELATIONSHIPS AS EVIDENCE OF
PREDATORY INTENT
7 6
When a seller charges less than its average cost in one market or
for one product and its price for other products or in other markets
exceeds its average cost, the courts typically will presume the existence
of predatory intent.7 Prices above average costs, however, are not nec-
essarily evidence of an absence of predatory intent. A firm can success-
fully implement a predatory scheme by selling above its average cost if
the structural preconditions for predation are present and the firm's
superior efficiency enables it to eliminat6 a competitor without taking
actual losses.78 Less than average cost pricing, on the other hand, is no
more an accurate barometer of predatory intent than above average cost
pricing is an indicator of nonpredatory conduct. For example, a first
principle of economic theory is that a firm maximizes its profits by
equating the variable cost of producing and selling additional units with
the increment to its total revenue resulting from the sale of those units.79
In other words, it is advantageous for a firm to produce at any price
that yields revenues above its additional variable costs and to continue
producing until it can no longer add more to its revenue than it adds to
distributor as to everyone else, full protection in the use and rewards of efficient methods in
production and distribution in return for depriving him of the right to crush his efficient smaller
competitors with the power and resources of mere size." 80 CONG. REC. 9417 (1936) (emphasis
added). When legislative history refers to the primary line of competition it reverts to war chest
and subsidization language. See 80 CONG. REC. 9416 (1936). The history of § 2 of the original
Clayton Act also indicates a congressional purpose to codify the cases under § 2 of the Sherman
Act that prohibited local price cutting designed to destroy competitors and acquire a monopoly
by powerful regional or national corporations. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
See also S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1914).
76. The material in this section was derived from the following sources: J. CLARK, STUDIES
IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COST (1923); J. MILLER, note 53 supra; E. SELIGMAN & R.
LOVE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE (1932); Burns, The Anti-Trust Laws and the
Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301 (1937); Clark, Statutory Restric-
tions on Sales Below Cost, II VAND. L. REV. 105 (1957); Ferrall, supra note 72; Hamilton, Cost
as a Standard for Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 321 (1937); McNair, Marketing Functions
and Costs and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1937); Rowe, Price
Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J.
929 (1951); A Symposium on the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REV. 196 (1954); Comment,
supra note 72.
77. See part I supra.
78. See page 277 supra.
79. In economic jargon, it is said that a firm will increase its output to the point at which
its marginal costs equal its marginal revenues.
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its costs. Thus the price of an additional sale or series of sales does not
have to equal or exceed average cost-the sum of fixed and variable
costs divided by output-in order to be profitable. As long as a sale
makes a net contribution to fixed unit cost that would not otherwise be
made, it is profitable. Producers consequently set their prices with refer-
ence only to their variable costs and their estimates of the demand for
their product.
Industries characterized by substantial excess capacity often spawn
less-than-cost pricing because firms will attempt to utilize their produc-
tive excess by selling below average cost on particular orders or in
particular markets. A price reduction in all markets, however, is fre-
quently self-defeating, since the revenue lost on all sales is not offset by
a corresponding reduction in unit costs when total demand at the uni-
formly low price pushes production beyond the minimum-cost output
or when the uniform price cut evokes immediate retaliation by national
competitors. A policy that requires price to exceed average cost thus
prevents a firm from utilizing its idle capacity, deprives society of a net
addition to the volume of available goods, compels those who can afford
the higher price to pay for unproductive plants and equipment, and helps
to stabilize the artificially high prices that often prevail in industries
with excess capacity.
Rather than lowering their prices in a particular market or on
individual orders, firms with excess capacity often reduce their general
price below average cost when they experiment with the demand for
their products at varying prices. A firm with excess capacity has a fair
idea of its variable costs at increasing outputs. It knows that its costs
will either fall or in some circumstances remain constant as output
increases. Indeed, a firm has no excess capacity when costs exceed
revenues at increased outputs. Profits, however, are equal to the differ-
ence between average cost and price multiplied by the number of units
sold. Two determinants of the profit equation-the fixed cost compo-
nent of the average unit cost and the number of units sold-are deter-
mined by demand, a factor largely beyond the knowledge or control of
the seller. A seller usually is aware of only one demand for its prod-
uct-the demand at its current price. Although a seller's advertising
influences demand, the demand for its product at other prices can be
determined with certainty only by changing its price. If a seller with
excess capacity suspects that relative demand for its product increases
at lower prices, a price cut will cause a larger percentage increase in the
number of units sold than the percentage decrease in price. Since varia-
ble cost will fall or remain constant as output increases, and fixed cost
will be spread among a higher number of units, the seller's total profits
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will consequently increase. The fact that a particular price decrease
causes losses may signify merely an erroneous estimate of demand by
the seller. Thus the fallacy of a policy that prohibits less than average
cost pricing is its dual failure to recognize that costs are frequently not
the determinant of price and that price, which determines sales, volume
of production, and utilization of plant capacity, is often the determinant
of cost.
Finally, a firm sometimes will take deliberate losses or lower prof-
its in the short run because it believes that it will increase its profits
thereby in the long run. Thus, a firm offering a new product, version,
model, or style of an old product may take short-run losses deliberately
or even sell at a price below variable cost in the hope that consumers
will develop a taste for or acquire complements to its product." If its
gamble proves successful, the firm will be able subsequently to raise its
price and recoup its losses. Moreover, a recession in demand that a
seller considers temporary may induce it to sell below average or
variable cost in order to maintain customer contacts, protect goodwill,
or hold its working force together. Of course, a general or marked
recession in demand would force all sellers to reduce their prices, thus
making the nonpredatory nature of a price cut obvious.
IV. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH TOWARD PRICE CUTTING
Section I of this Article suggested that the courts have used several
criteria to define harmful price cutting, including below-cost pricing and
the relative ability to subsidize local price cuts with other funds. Section
II, however, suggested that price cutting will be unprofitable for a firm
contemplating predation unless certain structural preconditions exist
within thd industry or market. It concluded that predation holds a rea-
sonable probability of success only when economies of scale are not
accompanied by absolute cost barriers to entry, when barriers to entry
substantially exceed industry exit barriers, or when a single firm has
exclusive control of essential resources that cannot be released by other
antitrust remedies. Moreover, it argued that the benefits of genuine
price competition demand that ambiguous price cuts should be con-
strued in favor of the price cutter. Section III revealed that less-than-
cost pricing and subsidization are inappropriate criteria for indicating
80. Coffee and tea are rival, competing products, or substitutes. Tea and lemon, however,
are complementary commodities, or complements. Tea and salt are between the 2 extremes, and
are independent commodities. An increase in the price of coffee will increase the demand for tea,
and therefore lemon. The demand for salt, however, will be unaffected. See P. SAMUELSON, supra
note 55, at 416-17.
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the potential harmfulness of a price reduction. This section offers new
criteria for accommodating the law and economics of price cutting. It
proceeds on the theory that a prima facie violation of an antitrust
prohibition must include two prerequisites: first, the relevant industry
or market must exhibit the structural and qualitative preconditions that
allow a price reduction to possess harmful potential; secondly, the de-
fendant must reduce its price without a reasonable probability of en-
hancing its profits except by the subsequent acquisition of a power to
control price gained by the elimination of vulnerable competitors. The
second element of the equation, which determines whether the defendant
acted with predatory intent, becomes relevant only after the first ele-
ment is established.
Implementing the suggestions proposed herein will require the ex-
ercise of considerable judgment and discretion. Rigid per se rules are
inappropriate tools for the complex task of identifying predatory price
cutting because the mechnical application of an automatic rule would
too often deny the presence of economic ambiguities and produce deci-
sions with anticompetitive ramifications. The proposals nevertheless
offer criteria that can be applied without undue reliance on prediction,
speculation, and economic theorizing. Although their application by a
court or jury will require no more discretion than is called for by the
evaluation of a merger challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act,"'
the repercussions of possible error would warrant undertaking even
additional decisional difficulties, since a merger often has neutral effects
on the competitive process8 2 while nonpredatory price cutting is typically
a positive sign of vigorous competition.
A. Structural Prerequisites to a Finding of Predation
Prior analysis suggested that predatory conduct cannot be profita-
ble unless certain structural preconditions exist within an industry or
market. Assuming that the managers of a firm are rational, predation
is unlikely unless the following conditions exist: first, the price level
represented by defendant's price reduction must endanger the continued
presence of at least one competitor in the industry or market if main-
tained over the long run; secondly, the price-cutting firm must be sub-
stantially more efficient or more powerful than its vulnerable competi-
81. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 prohibits mergers whose effect "may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," which is the same standard of injury
employed by § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
82. Price competition drives out excess capacity, but mergers other than spin-offs retain it.
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tors at the new price; and thirdly, eliminating its vulnerable competitors
must significantly enhance the price-cutting firm's ability to control
price.
1. Identifying Vulnerable Competitors.-The first element of a
prima facie case should be to identify those competitors unable to sur-
vive in the long run at a market price as low as that charged by the
defendant. Of course, it is impossible for the defendant's low price to
cause the exit of competitors from the industry or market when that
price exceeds the average costs of the defendant's competitors. Thus the
plaintiff should identify those competitors whose average costs of pres-
ent output are above the defendant's price at the time the complaint
issues.
2. Comparison of Relative Efficiencies and Market
Power.-Once vulnerable competitors are identified, the second element
of a prima facie case should be to establish which of those competitors
are at a significant cost or financial disadvantage to the defendant. Cost
advantage is relevant because a firm might utilize its superior efficiency
for predatory purposes without simultaneous subsidization. Since a
highly efficient firm can set its price above either its average cost or the
point necessary to require subsidization and nevertheless act predato-
rily,84 vulnerable firms that have significantly higher costs than the de-
fendant are potential victims of a predatory price cut even if they are
as financially potent as the defendant.
Relative financial strengths are, of course, significant when deter-
mining whether the defendant has the ability to subsidize any losses
incurred while eliminating a vulnerable competitor. A good rule of
thumb for comparing the relative financial strengths of a defendant and
its competitors is to divide the liquid assets of each party by its relevant
market share. Thus, if a defendant has a three-fourths share of the
market and a particular competitor has one fourth, the defendant has a
greater "war chest" only when its liquid assets exceed the competitor's
by more than a multiple of three. Unless there is a considerable differ-
ence between the parties' adjusted financial strengths, the weaker firm
will probably be able to secure cash resources from investors optimistic
about its prospects for survival and long-run earning potential. Thus one
should not presume that a firm is willing to go the limit and sacrifice
83. The average costs of competitors at their pre-price-cut outputs should serve as a rough,
long-run guide for identifying vulnerable competitors at the defendant's price. If the plaintiff were
the only competitor of the defendant, it would only need to establish its own financial inferiority
or higher costs.
84. See page 277 supra.
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all its liquid assets to destroy a competitor when a slight financial advan-
tage and short-run losses are the only evidence against the defendant.
3. Ability To Control Price.-The third element of a prima facie
case should be to establish that the elimination of the defendant's vul-
nerable competitors and the subsequent redistribution of market shares
among the remaining firms will substantially increase concentration in
the relevant market and thus potentially enhance the defendant's power
over price. 5 Unless there are barriers to entry, the defendant's power
over price will not be significantly enhanced by eliminating its competi-
tors. Economies of scale, absolute cost barriers, or artificial barriers
resulting from exclusive control of essential resources, are thus neces-
sary for the defendant to acquire power over price after the elimination
of competitors; otherwise, a price rise would immediately attract new
competitors. 86 Since absolute cost barriers become significant at approx-
imately 5,000,000 dollars, that figure is tentatively suggested as the
minimum cost barrier for establishing a prima facie case. Similarly, a
plant capable of producing at least ten percent of the output in the
relevant market is tentatively suggested as the minimal optimal size for
establishing a prima facie case based upon economies of scale. The
output generated by a smaller plant would be unlikely to depress the
market price sufficiently to deter entry.
Unless it has exclusive control of essential resources, the defendant
could rebut a presumption that it will gain the power to control price
by establishing that the market is "wide" enough to reduce its potential
power. For example, substitutes-products that perform essentially the
same function as the defendant's-will limit the defendant's subsequent
power to control price. If the defendant's and a competitor's products
are fairly close substitutes, an increase in the defendant's price will cause
a significant loss of business in favor of the competitor's product. Poten-
tial competitors furnish another limitation on the ability of a defendant
to acquire power over price. Firms that presently compete with the
defendant in other markets and that have low-cost access to the relevant
market would find it profitable to enter whenever the defendant tries to
increase price significantly. Similarly, firms with existing plants capable
of producing the defendant's product without costly retooling would
also find it profitable to enter the industry whenever the defendant tries
to raise its price significantly. The addition of firms producing substi-
85. The concentration test used should be similar, although not necessarily identical, to the
tests employed in Clayton Act § 7 merger cases. See Department of Justice Merger Guidelines,
B.N.A. ANTITRUST TRADE & REGULATION REP. No. 360, X-1 to X-6 (June 4, 1968).
86. See pages 280-82 supra.
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tutes, selling the same product in other geographic markets, or possess-
ing flexible productive facilities therefore may broaden the market
enough to reduce concentration below the point at which the defendant
would acquire a power over price. If not, the final element of establish-
ing a prima facie case is the problem of determining the defendant's
predatory intent.
B. Establishing Predatory Intent
Price cuts often are ambiguous bases from which to infer the
seller's intent. For example, barriers to exit increase the cost of eliminat-
ing a competitor and, all other things being equal, reduce the likelihood
that a firm will embark upon a predatory course of conduct.8 7 Similarly,
the presence of excess capacity or economies of scale within an indus-
try make it likely that price reductions are attempts to lower costs by
increasing output."8 Since predation is seldom the only, or even the most
likely, motivational inference that can be drawn from the fact of price
cutting, there should be a general presumption that price reductions are
nonpredatory, and a prima facie case should include proof that the
defendant set its price with the expectation of increasing profits after
eliminating its competitors.
Below-cost pricing, moreover, is an inaccurate barometer of intent.
A firm may price at less than cost in order to utilize idle capacity" or
from a miscalculation of the demand for its product at a lower price.9
Instead, proof of predatory intent should hinge upon all the following
factors: whether the price set by the defendant was below its variable
costs; whether previous sales experience of the defendant or its competi-
tors indicated the low price would be profitable; whether observable
changes in the composition, income, or tastes of consumers in the mar-
ket for the product or its complements had occurred since the defend-
ant's price was last changed; whether the defendant had recently ex-
perienced declining sales or some other impetus to reduce its prices;
whether the decrease in the defendant's profits was unreasonably large
under the circumstances; whether the defendant's previous cost experi-
ence at higher outputs indicated that it was near full (lowest cost) capac-
ity so that any decrease in price would increase costs; whether the
defendant sustained its self-imposed losses or lower profits for an unrea-
87. See pages 280-82 supra.
88. See pages 283-85 supra.
89. See pages 285-86 supra.
90. See page 286 supra.
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sonably long period; and whether the defendant's price cut was promo-
tional, resulting from an attempt to introduce a new product, or a new
version or model of an older product.
If the above factors do not clearly establish that the defendant
intended to destroy competitors, the court should adopt a "wait and
see" policy. If the defendant thereafter continues to take self-imposed
losses or reduced profits beyond the point at which a prudent business
manager would realize that there was no reasonable possibility of in-
creasing profits at that price, and vulnerable competitors are unable to
increase their efficiency and make profits at the defendant's lower price,
a finding of predatory intent should follow. Similarly, the profitability
of a promotional price cut that had as its objective a long run increase
in demand may eventually become so speculative that the imminent
danger of having the defendant acquire a power to control price from
its financial or cost advantage will clearly outweigh the uncertain bene-
fits to be gained from prolonging the price cut. In any case, the wait
and see policy requires a balancing of all the above factors in order to
determine the existence of a substantial probability91 that profits will
increase only by eliminating competitors.
V. CONCLUSION
The policies advocated by this Article obviously derive from a deep
skepticism regarding the allegedly harmful effects of price cutting. This
skepticism is the product of an economic analysis that suggests few
circumstances in which price cutting would be harmful. In most cases
beneficial alternative explanations are far more probable. Indeed, the
alternative explanations for price cutting are positively essential to the
effective functioning of the competitive process. Few innocent firms
would ever be found guilty of harmful price cutting according to the
analysis proposed in this Article; yet few firms that do possess the power
and intent to inflict substantial harm upon the competitive process
would escape detection. The business of a legal system is to make the
postulates of a society work. As long as competition remains the funda-
91. A violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act occurs only when the "effect" of a
price discrimination may "substantially" lessen competition or injure, destroy, or prevent competi-
tion with the discriminator. The section should not be interpreted to warrant a finding of a violation
when only a "reasonable probability" of predatory intent exists because a reasonable probability
of predatory intent also implies a reasonable probability of nonpredatory intent. Prohibiting price
cutting under such circumstances would itself create a reasonable probability of substantially
lessening competition because workable competition requires the opportunity for intensive price
rivalry.
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mental objective of the federal antitrust laws, conduct that so clearly
reflects the competitive essence must be considered innocent until af-
firmatively proved guilty.
92
92. Other materials employed in writing this Article include: R. BoWIE, GOVERNMENT REG-
ULATION OF BUSINESS (1955); A. NEALE, THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (1960); M. LINDAHL & W. CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1959); Mason, Monopoly in Law and Economics, 57 YALE L.J. 34 (1937); Comment, Civil
Actions Under Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act, 55 MICH. L. REV. 845 (1957).

